DITCHAM v. WORRALL.

RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

High Court, Common -Pleas Division.
DITCHAM v. WORRALL.
In 1875, the plaintiff and defendant, being infants, mutually promised to marry,
but no date was fixed. The parties remained engaged for four years, both having
in the meantime attained the age of twenty-one. In 1879, the plaintiff, at defendant's request, fixed the wedding day. The defendant subsequently refused to marry
the plaintiff. On action for breach of promise,
Held, that tile Infants' Relief Act includes a contract to marry, which contract
cannot be ratified after age ; but that in this case there was evidence from which the
jury should have found that there had been a fresh promise by the defendant after
he came of age.
field, by Lord COLErIDGE, C. J., dissenting, that there was evidence of ratification only, and none of a fresh promise.

ACTION for breach of promise to marry.
The trial took place at the last Hilary Sittings in Middlesex,
before Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.
In January 1875, while both parties were under age, and living
with their respective parents, they promised to marry each other;
but the date of the marriage was not fixed. The defendant came
of age in December 1875, and the engagement continued until
1879, the parties, who were then both of age, meanwhile continuing
as an engaged couple.
In January 1879, the defendant's pecuniary circumstances were
such as to enable him to marry, and the plaintiff, in the presence
of her father, and at the defendant's request, named the 8th of
June then next as the wedding day. Preparations were forthwith
made, but in May 1879, the plaintiff requested a postponement of
the marriage in consequence of the illness of her mother. The
defendant grudgingly acceded to her wish, but a dispute arising
shortly afterwards he refused to marry the plaintiff.
Lord COLERIDGE, 0. J., being of opinion that there had been a
ratification only, and no new promise by the defendant, and that
the ratification was void under the Infants' Relief Act (37 and 38
Vict., c. 62), s. 1, as decided in Coxhead v. Mullis, Law Rep., 3
0. P. Div. 439, only left to the jury the question of damages,
which they assessed at 4001. If the court should think that there
was evidence from which the jury should reasonably have found
that the defendant made a fresh promise to marry the plaintiff,
the plaintiff was to have judgment.
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Henrj Matthews, Q. C., and Stokes, for the plaintiff, moved for
judgment. They cited Coxhead v. Mullis, 8upra; Northeote v.
-Doughty, Law Rep., 4 C. P. Div. 885; Mawson v. Blane, 2 W.
R. 588; -De Thoren v. Attorney-General, Law Rep., 1 App. Cas.
686.
Digby Seymour, Q. C., and Bucknill, for the defendant, cited
Rawley v. Bawley, Law Rep., 1 Q. B. Div. 460; Harrisv. Wall,
1 Ex. 122.
The court being divided in opinion, judgment was delivered
seriatim, as follows:
LINDLEY, J. (read by Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.)-Before the defendant came of age, he and the plaintiff agreed to marry each
other; but no time for their marriage was then fixed. The promise thus made by the defendant was not binding on him whilst
under age; nor, since 87 and 38 Vict. c. 62, was it capable of
being ratified by him after he came of age; this was decided in
Coxhead v. Mullis, which, unless it should be reversed, must be
taken as binding on us.
After the defendant came of age his engagement with the plaintiff continued for some three years ; and at last the day for their
marriage was fixed. Ultimately, however, the defendant refused
to marry the plaintiff, and she thereupon brought this action against
him. The question is whether she can sustain it. If she can, the
verdict is to be entered for her for 4001. damages; if she cannot,
the verdict is to be entered for the defendant.
The question for our decision depends upon the true legal effect
of what took place after the defendant came of age, regard being
had to the fact of his engagement before that time. But for the
fact of the defendant's previous engagement, his conduct after he
came of age, and the fixing of the day for the marriage between
himself and the plaintiff, would not only be evidence of, but would,
in my opinion, satisfactorily prove, a promise by the defendant
after he came of age to marry the plaintiff on the day fixed. Nor
is there, I believe, any difference of opinion on this point.
But it is said that the conduct of the defendant, and the fixing
of the day for the marriage, are all referable to the promise made
by him when under age, and amount to no more than a ratification by him of such promise.
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In order to determine which of these two views is in point of
law the more correct, it is necessary to determine the real meaning
of a ratification as distinguished from an independent promise. A
ratification necessarily has reference to the past, and, as applied to
promises made by the person ratifying, a ratification is simply an
intentional recognition of some previous promise made by him, and
an adoption and confirmation of such promise with the intention of
rendering it binding (see Harrisv. Wall, and Rowe v. Hopwood,
Law Rep., 4 Q. B. 1). In other words, a ratification of a voidable
promise is a recognition of it, and an election not to avoid it but to
be bound by it.
There may be, or may not be, any new consideration for a ratification; but there must be a consideration for a new and independent promise. If, therefore, in any particular case there is no
consideration for the alleged ratification, it may be binding as a
ratification, but not as a fresh promise. Again, a so-called ratification which introduces new terms and stipulations is, at least as
to these, a new promise, and is binding as such if there is a consideration to support it, but not otherwise. Where there is a consideration and no new term introduced, the intentions of the parties, if clearly expressed, will afford a test whereby to determine
whether there has been a new promise or only a ratification of a
former promise. But, where the intention of the parties respecting
this particular point is obscure, their words or conduct ought to be
so interpreted as to render valid the transaction in which they were
engaged, if it is clear that this result at all events was intended by
them, and if there is no law rendering such interpretation inadmissible.
In this particular case the consideration for the ratification or
new promise was the willingness of the plaintiff to marry; that
willingness was expressed when the original promise was made,
and was again expressed when she fixed the day for the wedding,
and continued throughout until the engagement was broken off.
The plaintiff's willingness to marry on the day ultimately fixed for
the wedding is a sufficient consideration to support a fresh promise
by the defendant to marry her on that day. With respect to the
intention of the parties, all that is plain is that they considered
themselves under an engagement to marry, and ultimately intended
to marry on the day fixed. Their minds were never addressed to
the question of ratification, as distinguished from a fresh promise;
VOL. XXIX._57

DITCHAM t. WORRALL.

and their intentions as expressed by themselves throw no light
whatever on the question whether what occurred was actually intended to be a ratification of a previous promise, or to be a fresh
and independent promise. To hold this case to be one of ratification would be to render the engagement of the parties invalid, and
not binding, contrary to their manifest intention; whilst, to hold
that there was a fresh promise to marry, will be to give effect to
that intention. Unless, therefore, the statute forbids such an inference from their conduct, it appears to me that the jury might
have found, and ought to have found, that there was a promise by
the defendant after he came of age to marry the plaintiff on the
day ultimately fixed for the marriage, and not a mere ratification
of a promise made previously to marry at a day to be thereafter
fixed.
This method of reasoning is, in my opinion, warranted by the
decision of the House of Lords, in De Thoren v. Attorney-General,
in which a valid Scotch marriage was inferred from habit and repute, although there had been an invalid solemnization of marriage,
which accounted for the living together of the parties, and to which,
in fact, all their subsequent conduct was referable. In order to
give effect to the manifest intention of the parties, the House of
Lords in that case held that a subsequent promise to marry ought
to be inferred from their conduct. In my opinion, the present is
a much clearer case, by reason of the fixing of the day for the
wedding; for, although this is, no doubt, to be accounted for by
the original engagement, it is a clear and distinct renewal of the
original promise, with an important addition, and not a mere
recognition of such a promise and election to abide by it.
It remains, however, to consider whether the statute excludes
the view which, but for it, ought, in my opinion, to be taken of
this case. The statute was passed to protect persons from the consequences of entering into engagements when under twenty-one,
and of ratifying them after attaining twenty-one. As regards
debts contracted before twenty-one, the statute goes further, and
invalidates any promise made after twenty-one to pay them. The
statute, however, does not go so far as regards promises after
twenty-one to perform other obligations made before that age; and
it has already been held that a new and independent promise to
marry made after twenty-one is not invalid by reason of its being
preceded by a promise to marry made before twenty-one: North eote
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v. Doughty (Law Rep., 4 0. P. Div. 385). Still it must be borne
in mind, that, as regards ratification, the statute applies to and invalidates every ratification, by a person who has attained'bis majority of a promise made by him whilst under age, whether there be
a consideration for such ratification or not. In every case which
arises under the act, care must, therefore, be taken not to' deprive
persons of the protection intended to be afforded them by it.
Where the intention of the parties is obscure, where the so-called
new promise is made soon after attaining twenty-one, where it is
the consequence of an influence against which it is necessary to
guard-in all such cases a jury ought to be warned not lightly to
infer a fresh promise as distinguished from a ratification. But the
present case is free from all embarrassing considerations of this
kind; and the facts of this case were such that, notwithstanding
the statute, ajury might properly, and, I think, ought to, have found
that there was a fresh promise as distinguished from a ratification.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the verdict and judgment ought
to be entered for the plaintiff.
J.-In this action for breach of promise of marriage,
that the defendant during his minority, made an exproved
it was
press promise of marriage to the plaintiff, which was accepted by
her. The parties behaved as an engaged couple from that time,
and continued to do so for three years after the defendant had
attained his majority. On a particular occasion, about three years
after the defendant came of age, the plaintiff and defendant met,
and the defendant requested the plaintiff, in the presence of her
father, to na-me the day for their marriage, and the plaintiff named
a day, and it was then arranged that the marriage should take
place on that day.
Under these circumstances, two questions have been raised-first,
whether there was any evidence which ought to have been left to
the jury of a promise to marry made after the defendant had come
of age; s--cndly, whether, upon the evidence given, the jury ought
to have found for the plaintiff or the defendant, the court being, as
I understand, substituted for the jury, by consent of the parties, in
case it should be of opinion that there was evidence fit to be submitted to a jury. Upon both these questions I am of opinion that
the plaintiff is entitled to succeed.
It was decided by this court in Coxhead v. Mullis that section 2
DENMAN,

452
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of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, applies to actions for breach of
promise of marriage. By that decision I am bound. That case
further decided that, where there has been an express promise of
marriage during the infancy of a defendant, and the only evidence
subsequently i..evidence of mere conduct on the part of the engaged couple, consisting of their treating one another as an engaged
couple, and keeping company as such, without any evidence of
words capable of being construed as a fresh promise, such conduct
must be referred to the promise made during the infancy of the
defendant, and held to be mere evidence of ratification within the
meaning of the above clause. But it has also been held in Northcote v. Doughty, by which I am also bound, that, where there is
evidence not only that the defendant, after coming of age, and the
plaintiff behaved as before, but that the defendant used language
capable of being considered as a fresh promise, it is for the jury to
find whether the words so used amount merely to evidence of a
ratification of the promise made during infancy, or whether they
prove a fresh promise. In the present case, I think that the words
proved to have been used on the occasion on which the defendant
asked the plaintiff to fix the day for their marriage are wods
amply capable of amounting to a fresh promise to marry, and that
on that ground the case ought not to have been withdrawn from the
jury. I think it would be impossible to hold otherwise without
straining the act so as to include a case which it is impossible to
suppose that the act was intended to include. I may, perhaps, be
unduly influenced in coming to this opinion by a doubt which I
cannot overcome whether the act was intended to apply to the case
of promises to marry at all, and whether the case of Coxhead v.
Mullis was rightly decided, but I think that, in any case, the statute was not intended and ought not to be construed to go so far as
to warrant a non-suit in the present case. Even assuming Coxhead
v. Mullis to have been rightly decided, I cannot think that an
action supported by such evidence as that which was given in this
case must necessarily be held to be '"an action brought whereby to
charge a person upon a ratification made after full age of a promise
or contract made during infancy." At the very least, I think, it
was a question for the jury whether, under all the circumstances
of the case, the language used was merely evidence of a ratification of the promise made during infancy, or evidence of a fresh
promise mide after full age.
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The question, then, being in my opinion, one for the jury, I am
to say, by consent of the parties, whether the jury ought to have
found for the plaintiff or the defendant. On the whole, I am of
opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. Three years had
elapsed since the defendant had come of age. No time for the
marriage had ever been fixed. There was evidence that it had
been spoken of as an event that might not come off for many years.
The parties met. The defendant asked the plaintiff to name the
day for their marriage. The plaintiff named a particular day.
She might then have declined to fix any day. She might have told
the plaintiff that she preferred to be free,. and that he himself was
free, because the only promise given by him had been given during
infancy. Instead of doing this, she names a day in the presence
of relations, and thereupon arrangements are made for a marriage
on the day named. I consider that this all put together amounts
to cogent evidence of a mutual promise to marry one another on
the day named, made by both parties after the defendant had
attained his full age, and that it is not mere evidence of ratification
of the promise made three years previously, during the infancy of
the defendant, to marry at some indefinite future period.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled
to judgment for 4001., the damages assessed by the jury, and costs.
Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.-In this case I am unable to agree with
the judgments of my learned brothers; and, although I cannot say
that in the face of their difference I feel confident of my own
opinion, yet, as I entertain it, I must express it.
Two points arise in this case, one directly, the other indirectly
-the latter far the more important of the two, and therefore to be
first considered.
In the case of Coxhead v. Afulli8 my brother LoPEs and I held
that the Infants' Relief Act applied to the contract of marriage.
That case has never been overruled; but in the later case of Northcote v. Doughty, and again in his judgment in the present case,
my brother DENMAN does not conceal his opinion that it was not
well decided. It is true that my brother LINDLEY accepts the
case, and, in a sense, so does my brother DENMAN; but if it is not
law, the sooner it is overruled the better; and as the only judgment actually pronounced in it is mine, I ought, if on consideration I think it wrong, to say so, and to give every facility for
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having it reviewed in the Court of Appeal. If it is not law, there
is a short and summary end to the case before us, because I do not
question that but for the 37 and 38 Vict. c. 62, the verdict in this
case ought to be entered for the plaintiff. Is it law, then ?-or, to
put it in other words, are contracts of marriage within 37 and 38
Vict. c. 62 ?
I do not pretend that the question is easy nor that the answer to
it is clear. The preamble is general and applies in terms to contracts of infants without restriction, and to ratification by persons
of full age of contracts made by them during infancy, also without
restriction. It speaks also of necessaries, distinguishing contracts as
to them from other contracts. And it then proceeds to enact in sect.
1 that certain contracts, certainly not contracts of marriage, made
by infants shall be absolutely void. The enacting part is followed
by a proviso not perhaps very happily or clearly worded, but recognising unquestionably the existence of contracts voidable as distinguished from contracts absolutely void-an important recognition, as it seems to me, when the language of section 2 has to be
dealt with. If contracts of debt only are made void-but the existence of other voidable contracts is recognised-it is surely not
unreasonable to think that a contract of marriage may be one
among the latter class dealt with in the act, as it certainly was
before the act a contract voidable by the infant.
Then comes the second section which, like the first, is in two
parts. By the first it is enacted that no fresh promise made after
age shall be ground of action in the case of a contract of debt
made during infancy; by the second, no ratification made after full
age of any contract or promise made during infancy shall be a
ground of action. I own that, considering the distinction between
contracts void and voidable to be recognised in the act, that debts
are void, but other contracts are voidable; it seems to me reasonable to hold that the second part of the second section deals with
the contracts recognised in the proviso to the first, and that it
enacts that no ratification by an infant after full age of a voidable
contract-and (inter alia) of a contract of marriage-made by him
during infancy shall be a ground of action. It seems to me clear
that contracts other than debts axe dealt with in this section; for,
if not, the second part of it is inoperative. Promise to do a thing
already promised to be done must, at least in the great majority of
cases, include ratification, though ratification does not include
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promise; and, if the first half stood alone, it would, I think, be
impossible to hold that, though a fresh promise to pay a debt would
not be a ground of action, a ratification of an old promise would.
Besides, making every allowance for the difficulties of legislation,
I cannot believe that no more is meant by the clause as to ratification than if the words "or ratification" had been inserted after the
words "any promise," where those words first occur in the section.
If so, it follows inevitably that contracts other than contracts of
debt are within the section, and, if other contracts, then, as the
words are unlimited, contracts of marriage.
It has been said, and the observation is correct, that the words
of this section are very nearly those of 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 5, and
the words of section 5 have never been held to apply to contracts
of marriage. I am unable to say how far this latter assertion is
correct; but, if it be, my answer is that at least there is no decision that they do not; but, if the words are the same, the interpretation of them should be the same. Further, 9 Geo. 4, c. 14,
is a statute dealing primarily with limitation of actions, and the
statute before us is a statute dealing primarily with the protection
of infants from improvident contracts during infancy, and whereas
the later statute suggests the defence, the earlier statute to an
ordinary reader certainly does not.
Supposing these contracts to be within the words of the act, it
does not add much force to the argument to show that they are
ithin its mischief and its spirit. The verbal argument, however,
if it needs confirmation, may have it from this consideration; it is
not, indeed, every infant of either sex who needs protection, nor
at every time. There are infants, as every one knows, abundantly
able to take care of themselves. "Mialitia supplet wtatem" is a
maxim applicable by no means only to the criminal law. The
infant who bought a horse from one dealer and sold it to two others,
being paid by both his purchasers without ever paying his vendor,
is not a solitary specimen of his class. But Parliament has chosen,
on the whole for sound and good reasons, to protect infants by
legislation from the consequences of their contracts; and there is
nothing so mischievous, so fatal in its consequences, so capable at
least of destroying the happiness and blasting the usefulness of a
whole life, as a foolish and hasty marriage promised by a girl or
boy and enforced upon a man or woman. If Parliament did mean
to enact that the marriage contracts of girls and boys should not
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be made binding upon them as men and women by means only
of acknowledgment or ratification, Parliament intended to enact
what, in my judgment, is wise and right. I think Parliament did
so mean; and I desire to give full effect to its intention.
I have been thus full in discussing the true meaning of the statute, because I think it materially affects the second question to
be determined-viz., whether what happened in this case was a
ratification or a promise. Holding these contracts to be within the
act, and desiring to give full effect to its provisions, I must be satisfied that what was said and done here was a fresh promise before 1
can consent to a verdict for the plaintiff. I say, "was a fresh
promise," because that is, I conceive, the point to be established.
"Evidence of a promise," in the sense in which those words are
commonly used, will not do; and I think that in this argument a
fallacy lurks in their common use. They have survived from a
bygone state of things when they meant something very different
from the meaning which it is now sought to affix to them. In
former days, when neither plaintiff nor defendant could be witnesses-a state of the law which survived as regards this action
longer than as regards any other-it was very seldom that the
actual promise could be directly proved at all. It had to be inferred from conduct, from letters, from the giving of presents, from
preparations for the marriage, from a hundred facts or documents
consistent only, or only reasonably consistent, with a previous
promise. These things were most properly put to juries as "evidence of a promise," not of a promise made and re-made every time
a letter was written, or a kiss was given, or a present was made, or a
settlement was agreed upon, oi:a wedding-day was fixed; but of
a promise made, as such promises are made in real life, once for all
-evidence of a promise which explained these things naturally,
of a promise which the jury were to find as a fact, and of the
existence of which they were to be satisfied.
Now (unless I misapprehend the judgments of my learned
brothers), when the actual promise can be proved-nay, when it
has been.actually proved in terms-it is for the jury to say in each
ease whether evidence of phrases, or acts, or conduct, which in
old days would have been evidence of the promise, are or not evidence of another and fresh promise, because the phrase, or the act,
or the conduct implies a promise, and refers to a promise, and is
consistent only with the existence of a state of mind which recog-
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nises the promise as binding at the time when the phrase or the
act or the conduct is used or is done. Far better, in my opinion,
to overrule Coxhlead v. Muillis plainly; or, if Coxhead v. iJIullis be
well decided, to repeal the act itself, than to give authority to a
doctrine which will make the act in cases of this sort practically a
dead letter, and make for the parties to these actions a contract in
law which, I venture to say, neither of them at the time of the supposed making of it ever dreamed that they were making in point of
fact. A very great man has said, "After all, thiligs are what they
are, and not other thing&." If there is a promise in terms, eadit
quzeastio ; if there is not, I refuse to hold that, in a practical matter,
two people did what (as it is a contract, and therefore a question
of intention) I am certain they did not do.
As to the facts of this case, I am quite content to take them as
stated by my learned brothers. There was a definite contract between the parties to the action when both were under age ; they
remained for years upon the footing of engaged lovers ; at last it
was agreed they should be married at a particular time, and on a
definite occasion the parties met, and, the day being named by the
plaintiff, the day so named was fixed as the wedding-day. Now,
was this a fresh promise to marry made by them to one anotherfor this I apprehend is essential to found the action-or was it evidence of a recognition and a ratification of the promise which they
had both actually made several years before to marry one another?
It certainly was not a promise in terms; so far, at least, is conceded,
or at any rate cannot be disputed. Was it in law a promise or a
ratification ?
In order to ground an action, the promise must be mutual; it
must be an agreement, an aggregatio mentium, to the same terms
at the same time; the promise of each being the consideration for
the promise of the other. So that here there must have been an
actual present fresh promise to marry one another on the day when,
having promised years ago, the woman is asked to fix the day on
which the promise is to be fulfilled, and fixes it accordingly.
Pothier, again, says that for a binding contract there must be consent of contracting parties, capacity to contract, a thing certain to
form the subject of the contract, and that the contract must be legal.
So that the thing certain here was, I must presume, not the day
which was uncertain before, which it was important to render certain, and which was rendered certain by the contract, but the marVOL. XXIX.-58
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riage itself, which had been already certain as far as promises could
make it so for many years past. Take some parallel cases: a man
makes a binding contract for the purchase of a picture for one hundred guineas, no time agreed for its being sent home; he has no
space for it for some months ; at last he obtains space; he calls on
the vendor, and desires that the picture may be sent home, say on
the 5th of June; held, I suppose, a fresh purchase and sale of the
picture on the day when he calls to name the day. The same law,
I presume, of a horse left for a reasonable time in a vendor's stable
while arrangements are being made for its reception by the purchaser, and a day afterwards named for its delivery on the completion of such arrangements. And so in a hundred other instances.
These are, it may be said, eadem per eadem. So they are; and
he who accepts one conclusion may see no difficulty in accepting
the other. But the consequences are, to my mind, startling, and
such as till compelled by authority I am unable to accept. I will
not appeal to the common sense of mankind, and ask whether any
man or woman who fix their wedding-day do in fact think that they
are then promising over again and afresh to marry one another, because I have a most unfeigned respect for the sense of my learned
brothers, and their sense and mine have come on this question of
fact to totally opposite conclusions. I can but fall back upon the
saying already quoted-things are what they are, and not other
things-and affirm that, in my judgment (I am speaking, remember,
of a case in which there is an actual subsisting and acknowledged
contract to marry), a promise to marry is one thing, and fixing the
day when the promise is to be performed is another thing, and not
the same.
On the other hand, what happened in this case appears to me
exactly to fulfil the definition of a ratification-athabitio est consensus qui negotium perfectum insequitur. Here, the negotiumthe contract--was long since perfectum. It had been completed
years before; it was consented to, acknowledged, ratified in the
strongest way when the day for its execution was ascertained. I
am, therefore, of opinion that in this case there should be a non
suit and judgment for the defendant.
I cannot, as regards the circumstances and the result of this
particular case, regret that I am in a minority. The real facts,
and the facts proved in court are, no doubt, not always the same:
but judging, as I only can judge, by what was proved in court, the
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conduct of the plaintiff was as good, and that of the defendant was
as bad, as it could be; and, if the law will give them to her, the
plaintiff appears morally well entitled to the damages which the
jury have awarded.
In America also, wherever the common
law still prevails, an infant's promise to
marry is merely voidable and not void:
Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cow. 475; Hamilton
v. Lomar, 26 Barb. 615 ; Rush v. Wick,
31 Ohio St. 521; Leichtweiss v. Treskow. 21 Hun 487; Warwick v. Cooper,
5 Sneed 659 ; Feibd v. Obersky, 13 Abb
P. C. (N. S.) 402, note; Pool v. P2ratt,
I D. Chip. 252. And, therefore, it
inay be ratified after full age, and by
such acts or words as would ratify
any other voidable contract. But in
order to ratify any executory contract, it
is universally agreed that if words alone
are relied upon, they must amount to a
new promise, or at least to a positive
intention to abide by and fulfil the original
promise, and not merely a recognition
of its existence, or of the justice and
propriety of its fulfilment. More positive
words of promise are necessary to ratify
an infant's executory contract, than to
revive a debt barred by the Statute of
Limitations: Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H.
376 ; Tibbets v. Gerrish, 25 N. H. 41 ;
27ionpsonv. Lay, 4 Pick. 48 ; Proctorv.
Sears, 4 Allen 95. Therefore, where
the defendant, when sued, said: " My
brother ought to have paid the note ; the
writ shall not go to court; it shall be
settled; I will see my brother, who
ought to pay it," this was held no ratifi.
cation: Tappan v. Abbot, I Pick. 203.
So where the defendant said he "owed
the plaintiff, but was unable to pay him,
and he would endeavor to procure his
brother to be bound with him," the same
decision was made: Ford v. Phillips, 1
Pick. 202. "I recognise the debt as a
debt of honor," not enough: .3accordv.
Osborne, 1 C. P. Div. 569. So "I consider your claim worthy of my attention,
but not my first attention :" Wilcox v.
Roath, 12 Conn. 550. "I direct all my

just debts to be paid :" Smith v. Mayo,
9 Mass. 62. "I certify this bill is correct and satisfactory :" Rowe v. Hopwood, Law Rep., 4 Q. B. 1.
"Yes, I
owe the debt, and you will get your pay;
I suppose that is all you want, but I
shall not give a note on any consideration :" Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374.
And see Mawson v. Blane, 10 Exch.
205.
For a similar reason, a partial payment after majority, of a debt contracted
during infancy, will not of itself alone,
be a ratification, or warrant a jury in
.finding a new promise to pay the balance,
although it would clearly avoid the Statute of Limitations: Rinely v. Margaritz,
3 Penn. St. 428; Robbis v. Eaton, 10
N. H. 561; PUTNAM, J., in Ford v.
Phillips, I Pick. 203; Goodsell v. .3fyers,
3 Wend. 482 ; Thrupp v. ielder, 2 Esp.
628.
And it is probably for this reason that
a new promise made after action brought
will not avoid a plea of infancy, as it
would a plea of limitations : Merrin v.
Wilkins, 6 N. H. 432 ; Hale v. Gerrish,
8 N. H. 374; Ford v. Phillips, I Pick.
202; Thornton v. lllingworth, 2 B. &
C. 824; Thing v. Libbey, 16 Me. 55.
Doubtless for the same reason, a promise or expression of intention to pay
the debt, made to a stranger, not the
agent of the creditor, and not to be communicated to him, will not avail as a
ratification: Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend.
479; Bigelow v. Grannis, 2 Hill 120;
lioit v. Underhill, 9 N. H. 436.
But the question still remains whether
the evidence in the principal case would
not warrant a jury in finding a new promise after majority. The defendant requested the plaintiff to name the wedding-day, which she did, and preparations
were made for it; and subsequently he
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acceded to a postponement of it. Would
not this alone, without any reference to,
or any evidence of a prior promise, be
sufficient to justify a finding of a promise
to marry, made then, if never before ?
It is clear that a promise to marry need
not be proved by direct and positive
proof of words of promise actually
spoken, but may be inferred from acts
and conduct, &c., frequent visits, unusual attentions, &c. : WMghtman v.
Coates, 15 Mass. 1 ; Hubbard v. Bonesteel, 16 Barb. 360; Hotchkinsv. Hodge,
38 Barb. 121 ; Waters v. Bristol, 26
Conn. 405; Hoitt v. Moulton, 21 N. H.
586; Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann.
316; Espy v. Jones, 37 Ala. 379;
-Pescottv. Gugler, 32 Ill. 312.
If the proved intimacy between the
parties is such as is usual between persons engaged to be married, and unusual
between those who do not stand in that
relation, it would seem sufficient to warrant a finding that the relation exists :
Perkins v. Herse , 1 R. I. 493; Tefft
v. Marsh, 1 W. Va. 38 ; Coil v. Wallace, 4 Zab. 291 ; Leckey v. Bloser, 24
Penn. St. 401 ; Royal v. Smith, 40 Iowa
615; Roman v. Earle, 13 Abb. P. C.
(N. S.) 402-an interesting case on this
Doint: W/iitcombv. Wolcott, 21 Vt. 368,
explaining Munson v. Hastings, 12 Vt.
340. It is not necessary in such cases
to prove exactly when the sun rose; if
it be clearly shining at the time in
question, it is enough.
If the man's promise must be proved
.lirectly and absolutely, so must the
woman's, in order to constitute a con-

sideration for his promise; yet it is a
common practice to allow a jury to infer
her promise from her conduct towards
the defendant, such as receiving his attentions, &c., accompanying him on public occasions, corresponding with him,
&c. : Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb. 323;
Moritz v. Melhorn, 13 Penn. St. 331 ;
Hutton v. 3anseil, 3 Salk. 16 ; 6 Mod.
172 ; Wetmore v. Mdl, I Ohio St. 26 ;
Peppinger v. Low, I Halst. 384; Munson v. Hastings, 12 Vt. 346 ; Wilcox v.
Green, 23 Barb. 639 ; King v. Kersey,
2 Ind. 402 ; Thurston v. Cavenor, 8
Iowa 156.
Care, however, should be exercised in
this last case not to admit her declarations or conduct even, such as her preparations for the wedding for instance, as
proof of her promise, if entirely unknown or uncommunicated to the defendant. Some cases may have gone further
than this; but manifestly the plaintiff's
conduct or declarations, entirely unknown to the defendant, are not properly
admissible in her favor in this action any
more than in any other. See the discriminating opinion of HoAR, J., in Russell
v. Cowles, 15 Gray 582. And see
Walmsley v. Robinson, 63 Ill. 41 ; Lawrence v. Cooke, 56 Me. 196. In some
cases, her own acts, unparticipated in by
the defendant, and uncommunicated to
him, have been held admissible as proof
of her assent to the contract ; but that is
quite as objectionable as to admit the
same to prove his promise, or his acceptance of her promise.
ED U xD H. BENETT.

